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NIETZSCHE**
THOMAS A. COWAN*

I find that the attempt to assess Nietzsche's value to contemporary
jurisprudence is fraught with extreme difficulty. Not only was
Nietzsche perhaps the most controversial figure in the history of
ideas:' this might have happened to one whose message was simple.
But in Nietzsche's case the ideas themselves are highly controversial,
paradoxical and even "immoral." Like every great thinker Nietzsche
was more provocative to his enemies than to his friends. His enemies
took their revenge by burying him under a deluge of refutation and
abuse. Apparently Nietzsche was guilty of what might be called the
crime of "universal treason." He gave aid and comfort to all warring
factions of mankind. The result is that he who writes about Nietzsche
is likely to do nothing but add to the confusion.
For Nietzsche himself did nothing to stave off misunderstanding.
He wrote, so he thought, only for those who could understand him.
But in point of fact it appears that it was his detractors who made
the most of him. And what monstrous uses his name and his ideas
have been put to. Nietzsche himself lived in terror of what his
readers might make of his doctrines and well he might have, had
he lived to see Hitler posing in front of the Nietzsche monument in
an attempt to gain for Nazism a connection with the most truly revolutionary character of modem times.
On the other hand, the Jews whom Nietzsche blames as the perpetrators of the most awful moral catastrophe in history, that is to
say, Christianity, can take him as one of their own. The gentle Oscar
Levy indeed claims him as the contemporary Jewish prophet-the
man whose thunderous denunciations of the Jews for inventing the
"slave morality of Christianity" and for their acceptance of the
moral values of the "Gentiles" places him in the right line of descent
2
of the prophets of the Old Testament.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University.

** All references to Nietzsche are to the latest edition of his complete
works, FRiEDRICH Ni.Tzscm.: WE=~ (3 vols., Schlechta ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited WERKE]. The quotations were translated by Marianne Cowan. There is
appended to each reference to the Schlechta edition the common English title
and section number of the work in question.
1. See the spirited defense of Nietzsche in KAuFMANN, NIETzscHE: PHILosoPHER, PSYCHOLOGIsT,ANTICHRIST (1950).

2. "I must not forget that in every Anarchist, and therefore in every Christian, there is also, or may be, an aristocrat-a man who, just like the anarchist,
but with a perfectly holy right, wishes to obey no laws but those of his own
conscience; a man who thinks too highly of his own faith and persuasion to
convert other people to it; a man who, therefore, would never carry it to
Caffres and Coolis; a man, in short, with whom even the noblest and exclusive
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Consider this extraordinary paragraph from Dawn of Day:
About the People of Israel. * * * And where else could this abundance

of accumulated great impressions that Jewish history holds for every
Jewish family-this fullness of passions, virtues, decisions, renunciations,
battles, and victories of all sorts-where could it flow except in the end
into great minds and great works! And in that day, when the Jews will
be able to point to such gems and such golden vessels as their workwhich the European nations with their shorter and less profound experience never could and never will produce-when Israel shall have transformed its everlasting vengeance into an everlasting blessing of Europe,
then that seventh day will once more have come, on which the old God of
the Jews may rejoice in Himself, in His creation, and in His chosen people-and all, all of us shall rejoice with him!3
Can we conclude with Levy that in addition to everything else
Nietzsche was a Jewish prophet?
What then of the law?-for surely the Law and the Prophets go
together. Nietzsche takes almost no notice of the civil law. On the
other hand, that branch of the law, the criminal law, which the
legal community most disdains was for him the only part of it worth
Hebrew could shake hands. In Friedrich Nietzsche this aristocratic element
which may be hidden in a Christian has been brought to light, in him the
Christian's eternal claim for freedom of conscience, for his own priesthood,
for justification by his own faith, is no longer used for purposes of destruction
and rebellion, but for those of command and creation; in him-and this is the
key to the character of this extraordinary man, who both on his father's and
mother's side was the descendant of a long line of Protestant Parsons--the
Christian and Protestant spirit of anarchy became so strong that he rebelled
even against his own fellow-Anarchists, and told them that Anarchy was a
low and contemptible thing, and that Revolution was an occupation fit only
for superior slaves. But with this event the circle of Christianity has become
closed, and the exclusive House of Israel is now under the delightful obligation to make its peace with its once lost and now reforming son.
"The venerable Owner of this old house is still standing on its threshold:
his face is pale, his expression careworn, his eyes apparently scanning something far in the distance. The wind-for there is a terrible wind blowing
just now-is playing havoc with his long white Jew-beard, but this white
Jew-beard of his is growing black again at the end, and even the sad eyes
are still capable of quite youthful flashes, as may be noticed at this very
moment. For the eyes of the old Jew, apparently so dreamy and so far away,
have suddenly become fixed upon something in the distance yonder. The old
Jew looks and looks--and then he rubs. his eyes--and then he eagerly looks
again. And now he is sure of himself. His old and haggard face is lighting
up, his stooped figure suddenly becomes more erect, and a tear of Job is seen
running over his pale cheek into that long beard of his. For the old Jew has
recognized some one coming from afar-some one whom he had missed, but
never mentioned, for his Law forbade him to do this-some one, however, for
whom he had secretly always mourned, as only the race of the psalmists and
the prophets can mourn---and he rushes toward him, and he falls on his neck
and he kisses him, and he says to his servants: 'Bring forth the best robe and
put it on him, and put a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet. And bring
hither the fatted calf and kill it and let us eat and be merry!' AMEN." Levy,
Nietzsche in England: an Introductory Essay, in Thoughts Out of Season,
Part I, pp. XXVI-XXVIII
NiETzscHE, Levy ed., 1924).

(Vol. 4. THE CompLExT

3. 1 WEPiE 1154 (Dawn of Day § 205).

WoRKs

OF FMuEnIcH

1960]

NIETZSCHE

4
attention. And Nietzsche has certain things to say of the criminal,
the administration of criminal justice,5 and the mutual relations
between the criminal and his judges6 that those with commitments to
the subject should not ignore. Nietzsche's business was morality and
for him the criminal law is the door to it: moral reformers are successful criminals. Only the great criminal,7 himself personally worthy
of his crime, creates the conditions for moral reform. The very
greatest criminals cause the greatest moral upheavals and gain the
most far-reaching moral victories.
What do our greatest criminals teach us? Is it not the lesson that
our moralities are outmoded?8 That we must honor the criminal by
taking his crime seriously, that is, by ending the conditions which
call it into being? Nietzsche insists that our moralities wear out,
but do not for that reason become discarded. On the contrary, the

4. "What are we capable of? A man was so tormented all day long by his
spoiled and spiteful son that he killed him in the evening and, sighing with
relief, said to the rest of the family, 'Now we can sleep in peace.' How do we
know what circumstances could drive us to?" 1 WERKE 1200. (Dawn of Day,
§ 336). See also 1 WEmts 885 et seq. (Wanderer and his Shadow, §§ 22, 28);
1 WERms 1152, 1207 (Dawn of Day §§ 204, 366); 3 WERxE 618 et seq. (unpublished fragments of the eighties).
5. 2 WERxE 811-23 (Genealogy of Morals, Essay II, §§ 8-14); 2 WEmRE 6 et
seq. (Joyful Wisdom, § 43); 3 WERaE 505; 3 WERax 701 (unpublished fragments
of the eighties).
6. "About the Pale Law-breaker
"You do not want to kill, you judges and sacrificers, unless the animal nods
its assent? Look, the pale law-breaker has nodded his assent; his eyes express
his great contempt.
'My ego is something which must be mastered; my ego to me is the great
contempt of man'-that is what his eyes express.
That he judged himself: that was his highest moment. Do not let the
exalted one relapse.

There is no release for him who suffers so much from himself, unless it be

speedy death.
Your killing, you judges, should be compassion, not vengefulness. And see
to it that as you kill you yourselves justify life.
It is not enough that you become reconciled with him whom you kill. Let
your sorrow be love for the Superman: thus you can justify the fact that you
are still living.
'Enemy,' you may say, but not 'evil-doer'; 'sick man,' you may say, but not
'scoundrel'; 'fool,' you may say, but not 'sinner.'
And you, you crimson judge, if you were to say aloud everything you had
committed in thought, everyone would cry: Away with this excrement, this
vermin!" 2 WERKE 303 et seq. (Zarathustra§ I); see also 1 WERKE 888 et seq.
(Wanderer and his Shadow § 24); 1 WEmuuE 756 et seq. (Human All Too Human, pt. II § 33).
7. "In our civilized world we become acquainted almost solely with the
stunted criminal, the one who is crushed beneath the curse and the contempt
of society, distrusting himself, often disparaging and libelling his own deeda failure-type of criminal. We resist the notion that all great men were
criminals (in the grand, not the wretched style), that crime is a part of
greatness .

. . ."

3 WE=K

531 (unpublished fragments of the eighties).

8. "Moral changes: Alteration and fermentation are constantly working on
morality-the result of those crimes that have happy endings (to which, for
example, belong all innovations in moral thinking.)" 1 WERKE 1075 (Dawn of
Day § 98).
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longer persisted in, the tougher and coarser they become. The harder
do they cling to life.
Nietzsche dares to raise the question whether our moralities must
not be experimented with in the same way that we experiment with
the physical universe. 9 The methods of science, he thought, must be
applied to morality if we are truly to know what we are to do when
we confront a moral problem.10 Science is not morality, to be sure."
Science is the study of the means to a desired result. Morality is the
ensemble of human preferences in action. But surely we cannot afford
to neglect the study of the means for achieving a desired moral result.
12
More than this, we must experiment with ends.
9. "Philosophy, as I have up to this point understood it and lived it, is the
voluntary undertaking to search out the abominated and infamous aspects of
existence. From the long experience which such a journey through ice and
desert gave me, I learned to look differently upon everything that up to now
has philosophized; the hidden history of philosophy, the psychology of its
great names, came to light for me. This became my crucial standard: How
much truth can a mind endure? How much does he dare look at? Error is a
form of cowardice; evdry achievement of insight (Erkennen) follows from
courage, from hardness toward oneself, from cleanliness toward oneself. An

experimental philosophy such as I live assumes experimentally even the potentialities of the most rigorous nihilism, which is not to say that it stops with
a negation, with a No, with a Will toward No. On the contrary, it wants to
come through to its opposite, to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is,
without subtraction, exception or selection-it wants the everlasting circularity, forever the same things, the same logic, the same illogic of entanglement.
The highest condition a philosopher can reach: a Dionysian view of existence.
My formula for this is amor fati." 3 WERKE 834 (unpublished fragments of the
eighties).
10. "Folk-morality and folk-medicine. The morals which prevail in a community are constantly being worked on by everyone: the majority keep
heaping instances for the alleged relation between cause and consequence,
guilt and punishment, asserting its sound foundation with missionary zeal.
A few make fresh observations of actions and consequences, afterward drawing inferences and rules from them;.a very few occasionally take offence and
hence cause the general faith in a given moral belief to weaken. But all are
alike in their totally rough and unscientific manner, whether on the question
of instances, observations, or objections, whether on demonstration, confirmation, enunciation or confutation of a rule-the substance and the form are
both worthless, just as the substance and form of folk-medicine are. Folkmedicine and folk-morality belong in the same category and should no longer
be so differently evaluated; both are extremely dangerous pseudo-sciences."
1 WERKE 1021 et seq. (Dawn of Day § 11).
11. "Our physiological and medical sciences, our social and solitude theories,
are not yet sufficiently sure of themselves for the task of re-establishing the
laws of life and action; yet it is only from them that we may take the foundation stones for new ideals (though not the new ideals themselves)." 1 WERKE
1231 (Dawn of Day § 453).
12. "Whoever wants to make moral questions a subject of study just now
sees an enormous field of labor open out before him.... Supposing all these
labors to be accomplished, the most ticklish and critical of all questions would
then appear in the foreground: whether science is capable of providing the
goals for human action after it has proved that it can take them away and
annihilate them. And here would be the opportunity for a kind of experimentation which should satisfy every imaginable sort of heroism, centuries of
experimentation which might easily place into the shade all the great labors
and sacrifices of previous history. Science has not yet built its cyclopean
structures; but for this too the time will come." 2 WERK- 41 et seq. (Joyful
Wisdom § 7).
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The agonized burden of Nietzsche's thought is precisely the realiza13
tion of what it means to the moralist to experiment with morality.
13. "About the Way of the Creator
"Would you go into solitude, my brother? Would you seek the way to
yourself? Hesitate a little longer and listen to me.
'Whoever searches, easily gets lost himself. All loneliness is guilt'-so
speaks the herd. For a long time you were part of the herd.
The voice of the herd will echo in you, too. When you say, 'I no longer
have a share in your undivided conscience,' it will sound plaintive and pained.
You see, the undivided conscience gave birth to that pain, and the afterglow
of that conscience still illuminates your misery.
But you want to walk the way of your misery because it is the way to
yourself? Then show me your authority to do it and your energy!
Are you a new energy and a new authority? A prime motion? A selfstarting wheel? Can you compel even stars to swing around you?
Oh, there is much lusting for elevation! There are so many paroxysms of
the ambitious! Show me that you are not one of the lustful or the ambitious
sort!
Oh, there are so many great thoughts which have no greater effect than
bellows-first they blow you up and then make you emptier than before.
You call yourself free? I want to hear your sovereign thought, not that
you have escaped from a yoke.
Are you one of those who are entitled to escape from a yoke? There are
some who cast off their servitude.
Free from something? What does Zarathustra care? But let your clear eyes
show me you are free for something!
Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good? Can you suspend
your own will over yourself as if it were law? Can you be your own judge
and avenger of your own law?
It is terrible to be alone with the judge and the avenger of one's own law.
Thus is a star cast out into the void, into the icy breath of solitude.
Today you are still suffering from the many, you individual. Today you
still have all your courage and your hopes.
But someday solitude will weary you, someday your pride will cringe and
your courage will set your teeth on edge. Someday you will scream, 'I am
alone!'
Someday you will no longer see your elevation but your baseness all too
clearly; your sublimity will frighten you like a ghost. Someday you will cry,
'All things are false!'
There are feelings which try to kill the solitary man; if they do not succeed,
well then, they must die themselves. But are you capable of being a murderer?
Do you know the word 'contempt,' my brother? Or the torment of your
fairmindedness to be fair to those who have contempt for you?
You will compel many to change their opinion of you: for that they will
hold you to account. You came close to them and yet you did not stop.
They'll never forgive you for that.
You pass them on your way up, but the higher you climb, the smaller you
look to envious eyes. And the man who can fly is hated the most.
'How could you be fair to me,' you will have to say, 'I am choosing your
unfairness as my lot.'
They'll throw unfairness and filth at the solitary man; but, my brother, if
you would be a star, you cannot stop shining for them on that account.
And beware of the good and the just! They like to crucify those who invent
their own virtues-they hate the solitary man.
Beware also of those who are innocently simple-minded! Everything which
is not simple-minded, to them is sacrilegious. Also they like to play with
fire-with witch-burning, for example.
And beware, moreover, of the assaults your own love will make on you.
The solitary man too quickly extends his hand when he meets someone.
There are some to whom you may not extend your hand-at most your paw.
And I would that your paw had claws as well.
But the worst enemy you can meet will always be you; you lie in wait for
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In law, we have lately become accustomed to the position that since
law is a means of social control, it can be made a better or a worse
means; that law must justify itself by its results. The telelogical or
purposive character of law is one that was recognized in antiquity.
Greek philosophy took the question of the nature of law as a central
problem. For the Sophists, law is a convention and not a lofty one
at that. It is a conspiracy of the weak against the strong. Note however that to regard law as conventional was the degraded view of the
nature of law. Beginning with Socrates and lasting until modern
times a contrary view of the nature of law always enjoyed the support of the most distinguished moralists. This view held that law
is one throughout the physical and moral universe; that the law of
nature is eternal and perfect; that that part of law which changes
(the positive law) is law in a lesser or meaner sense. Indeed, positive
law derives its authority (what little authority it has) froir the
higher law of nature.
Theories of natural law being based on moralities have amazing
pertinacity. This is precisely Nietzsche's point: they do not know
when they are dead.14 They have the protection of collective authority
which itself endures for eons. Indeed until relatively recently it was
possible to believe that the law of nature endured forever and bound
equally all mankind.15 It is still customary for us to assume that all
yourself in caves and woods.
You solitary one, you are on the way to yourself. And your way lies past
yourself, and past your seven devils!
You will be a heretic in your own eyes and a witch and a sooth-sayer and
a fool and a doubter and unholy and a scoundrel.
You must want to burn in your own flame: how else would you be renewed,
if you have not first turned to ashes.
You solitary one, you go the way of the creator: you would create a god
for yourself out of your seven devils.
You solitary one, you go the way of the lover: you love yourself and have
contempt for yourself as only a lover can feel contempt.
Out of his contempt, the lover must create! What do you know about love
if you never had contempt for the thing you loved.
Go to your solitude with your love and your creativity, my brother; much
later only will justice limp after you.
Go to your solitude, accompanied by my tears, my brother. I love him who
would create something beyond himself and thus is engulfed.Thus spoke Zarathustra." 2 WERiu 325 et seq.
14. "It is a new justice, however, that is necessary! And a new war cryl
And new philosophers! The moral earth, too, is round! The moral earth too
has its antipodes! The antipodes too have their right to exist! There is still
another world to discover-and more than one! Aboard ship, ye philosophers!" 2 WsiuE 168 (Joyful Wisdom § 289).
15. "Law of Nature: A Phrase of Superstition. When you speak so rapturously of lawfulness in nature, you must either assume that all natural things
follow their law in free, voluntary obedience-in which case you are admiring
the morality of nature-or the thing that enchants you is the notion of a
creative mechanic who has made the most cunning imaginable clockwork,
ornamented with living things. Necessity in nature is humanized by the
concept of 'lawfulness' and becomes a last refuge for mythological reveries."
1 WEPKE 747 (Human All Too Human, pt. II, § 9).
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peoples who do not subscribe to the common moral opinions of
Western man should be taught to do so. It is supposed that all
moralities have a common base and that that base is the forms of
Western culture. Indeed as machine civilization and the political
institutions of democracy and socialism penetrate the whole world,
it is assumed-that these systems have at least a common moral base
and that this common base is the universal essence of morality.
In contrast with this attitude is the assumption of teleological
jurisprudence that all law is purposive and provisional: a means to an
end. It follows that none of it has an absolute character. This assumption is in fact challenged by two contrasting theories. One
purports to seek factual elements in juridical situations common
throughout the world. The common elements are then taken as an
empirical base for a uniform system of world law. Such is the assumption made by empirical investigators in international law. They
are looking for a modern jus gentium. The doctrine is opposed by
those who seek rather a common moral basis for a universal law of
nature, a modern jus naturae. Nietzsche would have been opposed
to each of them,16 the empirical as well as the natural law investigator,
for each seeks to discover a common enduring morality to govern
mankind. The first, presumably, if they were to find common elements of juridical practice throughout the world would insist that
these ought to govern mankind. The others come to their eternal
moral principles direct.
For each of them and for all of us Nietzsche had bad news: that
God is dead, and that our moralities are dying too. Hence it behooves
us to find a new morality to live by. Although Nietzsche disclaimed
any intention to tell us what the new morality should consist of,
almost every page of his writings belies the disclaimer. He does
indeed tell us, again and again, what the new order of morality
should look like. But he repeats just as often: do not take it on
his say-so. There is no escaping the obligation to experiment with
morality. Our only choice is to experiment blindly, that is to say,
to let morality happen to us, or to act with what intelligence we have.
The implications for experimental jurisprudence are critical. If
you would experiment to discover how law may best serve its ends,
you must first (or last) experiment to find out what these ends are.
How should we go about making our moral-legal experiments?
Nietzsche's writings abound in hints on how to begin to ascertain
what morals suit the kind of man we hope to produce.
Take the criminal law as an example. The criminal has made a
sacrifice (it may have been his life) to tell us that a certain legal or
16. ". . . legal conditions are temporary means counselled by good judgment, not ends." 1 WERxE 889 (Wanderer and his Shadow § 26).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

moral rule is wrong. Do we take him seriously? Do we admit in
Nietzsche's words that the criminal is worthy of his crime? That
he is a moral experimenter under the most appalling odds? No,
we do not. Customarily, we condemn his action as wrong and seek
for means to counteract it and to prevent its repetition. In other
words we try to teach the criminal something through his crime
instead of learning something ourselves. Is this not perverse? There
was a time (not very long ago) when we treated the medical investigator in precisely the same manner. To the extent that he
experimented, he was taken to be a criminal. Suppose however
that we shift our view of morality-it is certainly as important as
our health-and say that we will heartily accept the best moral
conditions and the loftiest moral rules that investigation can disclose. Would not our criminals then become heroes; pioneers in the
realm of the human spirit? We have already seen criminals (the
fathers of the Constitution) become the beloved heroes of their
country. We have seen loathsome heretics become great scientists
by no action of their own but by a change in the moral standards of
their time. As illness teaches the way to health, crime points out the
path to justice. In this view not the accused but his judges are the
criminal:--the judge who cuts off moral inquiry by announcing the
moral rule without scientific investigation. But with the judge stand
condemned all of us. Do we not all think we know which moral rules
are not only right but even inevitable? And do we not all succumb
to the "herd instinct" to preserve these ancient sentiments at all
costs? 7 Certainly, if we do, we may reasonably expect the "moral
approbation" of the multitude. If on the other hand we do not, we are
criminals and woe unto us if we are not successful criminals.
We need not accept Nietzsche's values in order to accept his value.
We need not accept his belief that of all human goods morality is
nearest to the ideal of health. We need not accept his ideal of individual solitude, his personal crochets, his outrageous consciously
contrived megalomania, nor his insistence on teaching by every hook
or crook available. We may forgive him for these idiosyncrasies but
can we forgive him for announcing the death of God? Yes, I think
17. "The light that finally dawns upon philosophers: they must not only
cease receiving their concepts as though they were gifts; they must not merely
clean them up and clarify them; instead they must first of all make them,
create them, pose them and persuade men to them. Up to now, on the whole,
philosophers have trusted their concepts as though they were a wonderful
dowry from some kind of wonder-world, but they've turned out to be the
heritage of our most remote ancestors, the stupidest as well as the most
competent. This piety toward whatever we find in ourselves is probably part

of the moral element of cognition (Erkennen). Just at present we need
absolute scepticism toward all inherited concepts (as was possibly possessed
once by a certain philosopher-who else but Plato-who of course taught the
exact opposite!)." 3 WERKE 844 (unpublished fragments of the eighties).
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we can, however steadfast our faith may be in a Divine Being. For
in Nietzsche we witness not only the most awful tragedy that can,
happen to a sensitive soul, the loss of faith, but at the same time
a surmounting of that tragedy 18 by a sublime courage which accepts
the worst possible aspects of a Godless universe and the meanest
qualities of a degraded species of being, man, who somehow realizes
that he is only a depraved caricature of his potential self. Could
anyone who did not recognize such a fate as already his possibly ask
for it? Does anyone ever ask for a loss of faith? More often than he
announces the death of old gods, Nietzsche heralds the birth of new
ones. 19 And is this not precisely what many of us mean by God? At
any rate no devout Christian for whom God has died and risen again
will treat lightly the plight of an anguished soul whose God is dead
forever. After all, as Carl G. Jung has said, it was not Wagner but
20
Nietzsche himself who broke before the Cross.
We need not accept Nietzsche's strictures against democracy; in
fact, as it seems to me, we cannot. And yet do we not have the
obligation to examine democracy and its workings with the same
cold scrutiny that Nietzsche gave it? Who is there today to carry
criticism to the limit of challenging the very foundations of democracy? Who can be trusted, who can trust himself to do this job?
Is it not the ultimate triumph of Fascism, its "revenge" Nietzsche
would call it, that democracy must not be challenged by those who,
would live by it? This conspiracy of silence is precisely what its
most dangerous enemies could wish for it most heartily. Only thus
could they be assured of its ultimate destruction.
Can one safely criticize both Pro- and Anti-Semites 2oa today? Can
one look with Nietzsche's awful "seeing eye" upon the most portentous issue dividing the human race today, namely, the biological
differences of color in the world's peoples? Since the dawn of history
18. "Natural view of the pious and impious: A truly pious man must be to
us an object of veneration, but likewise a wholly sincere, resolute impious
man. In the presence of the latter we are as though near high mountains
where the mightiest rivers have their source; with the pious as though under
vigorous, broad-shading unmoving trees." 1

WERKE

772 (Human All Too

Human,pt. II, § 93).
19. "And how many new gods are still possible! Even to me alone, me in
whom the religious, i.e., the god-creating instinct often gets lively at the
least opportune time-how different, how variously the divine has revealed
itself to me each separate time. So many strange things have. come into my
ken in those timeless moments which fall into one's life as though they fell
from the moon, when one simply no longer knows how old one is already or
how young one will yet be. I should never doubt that there are many sorts
of gods." 3 WERKE 838 (unpublished fragments of the eighties).
20. JUNG, Two ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 34 (Bollingen Series No.
20, 1953).

20a. I do not mean to intimate that Nietzsche was ever "fair-minded"
about what he thought to be evil. On the contrary, he was most passionately
partisan, particularly against Anti-Semites. See KAUFMANN, op. cit. supra,
note 1, at 40, 256.
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white men have used religion and morality as the surest weapons
in their fight to maintain color supremacy. The Bible is an account
of the origin of a white race; the question of the origin or even the
existence of the colored races is largely ignored. White Aryans used
the Hindu religion to maintain the caste system; and caste means
color. I believe Nietzsche would be inclined to think that the present
dispute between the North and the South on the color question is
merely one of degree. Granted that this difference is a serious oneall color differences in the world of contemporary politics are serious
differences. Still, Negroes in the North occupy only inferior positions
in government and industry. Social equality does not exist even as an
ideal. These speculations in the Nietzschean vein and others more to
the point are what might be expected to emerge from a realistic
jurisprudence that could unearth out of our prevailing moralities
the manifold color prejudices hidden in them.
Can we refuse to admit with Nietzsche that modern morality must
become individual rather than collective? 2 1 This is but a continuation and intensification of the central moral message of Christianity:
the responsibility of the individual for his own salvation. The real
question here is this: can we go beyond Christianity and permit, nay,
insist upon, moral experimentation by the individual? Can we lift
or try to lift from the individual the heavy burden of guilt which
21. "The individual shall sacrifice himself-such is the commandment of
the morality of mores. These moralists, on the other hand, who, following in
the footsteps of Socrates, urge the morality of self-control and abstinence
upon the individual, as being to the greatest advantage to himself, his most
personal key to happiness, are exceptions. If they seem otherwise to us, it is
because we have been educated under their influence. They all are walking a
new road, accompanied by complete condemnation of all the representatives
of the morality of mores; they have detached themselves from the community;
they are the immoral ones, evil in the deepest sense of the word. Thus to a
virtuous Roman of the old school every Christian whose 'foremost goal is his
own salvation' must have appeared evil. Wherever there is a community and
consequently a morality of mores, there is found the idea that the punishment
for every offence against mores falls, above all, on the community itself. I
mean that supernatural punishment, the visitations and limits of which are so
difficult to comprehend and which form the subject of so much anxious
investigation and superstitious fear. The community can insist that each
individual make amends to another individual or to the community itself for
an immediate injury which may have followed upon an action of his. It can
also wreak a kind of vengeance on the individual for having caused the clouds
and storm of divine wrath, as supposed effects of his action, to gather over
the heads of the community. But it nonetheless feels the guilt of the individual chiefly as its own guilt and bears his punishment as its own. 'Our morality
has grown slack if such deeds are possible'-such is the plaintive cry in the
soul of each member. Each individual action, each individual mode of thinking moves us to shudder. It is incalculable how much suffering just the rarer,
choicer, and more original minds must have undergone in the course of history
because they were ever being looked upon as the evil and dangerous ones,
worse-because they felt themselves as such. Originality of every kind has
acquired a bad conscience under the supreme rule of the morality of mores.
Up to this very moment the heaven of the best is far gloomier than it need be."
1 WERKE 1020 et seq. (Dawn of Day § 9).

19601

NIETZSCHE

Christianity imposes on every moral experimenter? Is. it not the
function of law to take responsibility for organizing this revolution
in the meaning and effect of moral experiment? Can we not risk
extending legal protection to cover the moral right and. the duty of
the individual to experiment with morality? Presently our law
protects from governmental oppression experimental thought and
even experimental speech, including thoughts and words aiming at
moral revolution. Can we envisage a legal system so advanced that it
can find a place for moral experiments in action?z2 The inference then
would be that we must labor to make the kind of world in which
the moral agent is as free to experiment with mdrality as is the
scientist in the realm of nature.
THE INTELLECTUALS

Nietzsche, the great existentialist, the great accepter of life in all
its bitterness, suffering and woe-the man whose test of a yea-sayer
to life was this: suppose you knew that in all eternity you would be
doomed to relive just this horrible life over again and again, would
you still say "yes" to it?-says to us intellectuals: Do you now accept
the evils, the wretchednesses, the hatreds, the mistakes of life as
challenges to test your mettle? Even if you knew that you would
have to repeat them for ever and ever?
Nietzsche's challenge is issued to the intellectual. The intellectual
now has his turn to rule the earth. How well can he do it? This
much is certain: he must do it intellectually. The aristocratic warrior
had his turn and passed on. It would be well to conserve his virtues.
If not, the intellectual may have to repeat the hard lessons which the
warrior learned in a school whose curriculum was by no means
idyllic. But however attractive the aristocratic virtues may appear
to the intellectual, they must remain for him no more than an inspiration. His real work is with the intellect; he must think. Nietzsche
announces that the countless millenia during which man did his work
unconscious of his motives and his goals are over. Contemporary
22. "Free-doers and free-thinkers. Free-doers are at a disadvantage as
compared with free-thinkers, because mankind suffers more visibly from the
consequences of actions than of ideas. Yet if we consider that they, like the
others, seek their satisfaction, and that the mere contemplation and utterance
of forbidden matters afford such satisfaction to free-thinkers, then we must
say that as to motives there is no difference between them. And as to consequences, the case-provided we do not judge, as the world generally does,
from the most immediate outside appearance only-will actually go against
the free-thinker. We have to take back a great deal of the disparagement
which mankind has allotted to all those who with a deed have broken through
the bondage of some moral custom. Our very word for them is Verbrecher"
[i.e., 'criminal.' The German word means, of course, simply 'breaker,' 'demolisher.' There is none of the etymological implication of the Anglo-FrenchLatin 'crime.' Tr.] 1 WERKE 1028 (Dawn of Day § 20).
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students of human nature concur in this judgment. Not alone
psychoanalysis in the realm of the mind, and socialism in the sphere
of economic and political action, but the law as well agree. We in
law no longer believe that the blind instinctive forces of the unconscious can be trusted to guide us in the pursuit of justice. We
must take thought; we must investigate, question and test even our
most fundamental beliefs. In brief, we must admit science to our
enterprise and thus intellectualize the whole process of law-making
and the administration of justice.
It is quite hard for us to realize how highly intellectualized the
legal process has become in the last century. It is equally difficult
to perceive how sophisticated the law has gotten, how self-conscious,
how self-critical. As compared with legal processes for example, the
business of science is still based on naive faith and unconscious motivations that would do credit to a Renaissance adventurer in search
of new worlds. Even scientists of note hardly question the collective
sentiment of the craft that all "scientificating" is an unqualified good.
So far has this naive faith progressed that scientists feel exempt
from responsibility for the harm they produce. Characteristically
human as they are, however, they do like to receive credit for the
good that is thought to follow from their work and they prefer not
to question whether the effects of scientific knowledge of a certain
sort may be harmful. But lawyers find it natural to have the question raised whether law is or is not the appropriate means by which
a given social problem should be attacked. Roscoe Pound long ago
spoke of the "Limits of Effective Legal Action." 23 Can one possibly
imagine a great scientist raising in routine fashion the problem of
the Effective Limits of Scientific Truth?2 There was a time when it
was regarded as impious to question whether a given law should be
or not be. The matter was decided on high; it was sacred, or as we
might say today, it issued from the unconscious. But for law, that
day is long past. Our intellectuals see the whole panorama of law
as a means to an end, a device for social control. Only the age-old
instinctive distrust of the dangers of intellectualism and of the
limitations of the conscious mind remain over to guard us from
intellectual hybris. The natural law is always with us as a warning
against intellectual arrogance. Indeed, no one is more aware than
Nietzsche of the harm which results when we are cut loose from our
instinctive roots. So real and pressing did the danger loom to Nietzsche and so urgent were his messages to this end, that there is abroad
23. 27 INT'L J. ETHICS 150 (1917).
24. "Few in truth serve truth, because only a few have the pure will to be
just, and of these again only a very few have the strength to perform justly."
1 WERKE 244 (Thoughts Out of Season, pt. I, § 6).
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a popular notion that Nietzsche advocated unbridled reliance upon
and enjoyment of the instincts. Just the reverse is the case. Still the
caveat is so exigent that it does seem to override the rule.
Our intellectuals, and especially our legal intellectuals, find that
Nietzsche's thinking is more and more to the point as legal consciousness becomes more highly self-conscious. Legal practice in a world
become politically conscious inevitably drives law toward consciousness also. When men consciously set out to make governments, law
must necessarily rise to the level of consciousness to meet the new
tasks. Judicial decision, which can still pretend at times to be guided
by the immemorial oracles, gives way in large part to conscious
legislation. Finally, the question of whether judges do or do not
legislate is seen to be an anachronism, and is quietly dropped (as
Cardozo so deftly did) as a matter which is no longer even a problem.
We all admit that law-making is a conscious intellectual process.
Do we also admit that morality should become a matter of intellectual
choice? I cannot speak for the legal community in this respect. No
one has authorized me to do so and I recognize that the question
is a delicate one. Still I believe I can say that of all the intellectual
groups in the culture the legal community is the least likely to be
shocked by the proposal. Considering our stake in the outcome and
what is apt to happen to law if morality becomes truly experimental,
I think that of all the intellectuals attracted by Nietzsche's proposal
to experimentalize morality the legal intellectual has the most to gain.
THE WnLL To PowER

This philosophical term is the tag by which Nietzsche is best known
to American readers. The volume entitled The Will to Power is the
collection of his writings that is best remembered by those who love
Nietzsche not. Even today it is the most heavily thumbed of the
series of English translations of Nietzsche's work. The Will to Power
was of course not a book by Nietzsche at all. After his madness had
set in, his wretched sister, Elisabeth F6rster, herself the wife of a
pre-Iitlerian anti-semite who tried to found a Fascist state in South
America, concocted the book out of fragments of Nietzsche's writings.
She distorted and falsified the actual Nietzschean documents. The
result was the proto-fascist diatribe which she herself called The
Will to Power. The "book" has lately25 been dissolved back into the
bits and pieces which Nietzsche left.
The term "will to power" is to Nietzsche what "water" was to
Thales, "flux" to Heraclitus, "idea" to Plato, "id" to Freud, or "libido"
25. See Schlechta's philological appendix to the above-used Nietzsche edition, 3 WERKE 1393.
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to Jung. It is for him the most extensive category conceivable. I
do not mean that one philosopher's basic conception is the same as
another's. On the contrary, each conceives his basic term as solely his
(at least his treatment of it is thought of as unique). So too Nietzsche.
Nietzsche was passionately insistent that the fundamental basis of
all action was the will to gain more power. But this is almost a physical conception-like saying that all things strive to gain more
energy. 26 It is not a moral principle. Since all things inevitably strive
for power and more and more power it would be fatuous to say that
they ought to exert their wills to gain greater power. The term is a
term of description, not exhortation. It carries with it moral implications to be sure. One of these is a denial of freedom of the will. The
will is not at the service of anyone's whim, choice or resolve.
For myself, I think of Nietzsche's treatment of the will to power
in connection with Adlerian individual psychology.2 7 Whole sections
of the writings of Alfred Adler can be illustrated in the writings of
Nietzsche and vice versa. Another analogue in analytical psychology
is the "introverted character" as outlined in the typology of C. G.
Jung.28 Nietzsche was well aware that the twentieth century was
to be the century of psychology, that its ills were destined to be
mental, and that the chief concern of contemporary culture was to
be human nature itself. Although he was deeply sympathetic with
science as the generalized pursuit of truth, he foresaw clearly that its
methods were wholly inadequate to deal with the complex character
of human nature and that an immense amount of free speculation on
the psychic nature of man must precede any methodical scientific
investigation into this "ultimate confusion." He therefore spent much
of his substance in a long series of aphorisms on the nature of human
'nature, flashing insights into the springs of human action. He knew
that he had only a short time in which to bequeath to the world
the store of wisdom which had been vouchsafed him and he worked
constantly within the shadow of death.
There are many jurisprudential lessons to be learned from Nietz26. "My theory would be: that Will to Power is the primitive affect-form,
that all other affects are only manifestations or developments of it; that considerable light is shed if in place of individual 'happiness' (the pursuit of
which is said to be dear to all living creatures) we say 'power'-the pursuit
of power, of more power. (Pleasure is only a symptom of the feeling that
power has been attained-a consciousness of difference-pleasure is not pursued but pleasure occurs when the pursuit has attained its end; pleasure
accompanies; it does not motivate); that all motivating energy is will to
power, that there is no physical, dynamic or psychic energy other than
this." 3 WERam 750 (unpublished fragments of the eighties).
27. See particularly ANSPAcHER, THE INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ALFRED
ADLER, (1956) which contains an Adler Bibliography. See also ADLER &
DEUTSCH, ESSAYS IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS OF
ALFRED ADLER'S THEORIES, (1959).
28. JUNG, Two ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 29 et seq. (1953).
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sche's conception of the will to power. Foremost is the inference to
be drawn from it that the will is not free. Modern Western jurisprudence of course is based on the opposite assumption. So much so,
that it would be difficult for us to conceive of a system of law resting
on moral determinism. Not alone the whole of our criminal law but
much of civil law as well would have to be fundamentally re-cast
Yet there are many indications that the civil law at least could get
along without the notion of freedom of the will. I mention only the
theory of objective assent in contracts, liability without fault in
torts, the growing tendency of legislation to ignore motivation and
to concentrate on action, the manifestly objective character of social
welfare law which is based essentially on need rather than on merit,
worth, guilt, intention, moral responsibility or other states of mind
ordinarily associated with freedom of the will. Finally, the growing
law of status infers legal conclusions not from the exercise of the
agent's freedom of action but from the kind of person he is, or the
nature of the group to which he belongs. Here again law in practice
is ahead of law in theory and Nietzsche, as was customary with him,
was ahead of both. In his lifetime, jurisprudential theories based on
freedom of the will were at their zenith. And it cannot yet be said
that any thorough-going repudiation of the hypothesis of freedom of
the will has been worked out in the philosophy of law, One who
proceeds from the hypothesis of -the non-freedom of the human will
would discover that the whole corpus of the law would have to be
re-worked. In keeping with the Nietzschean philosophy, it is quite
evident that this "transvaluation of all legal values" would itself not
be a matter of free choice. Stern necessity forces the task upon us in
the course of time. Our choice, as Spinoza would say, lies in our
decision to recognize the inevitable and to conform to its precepts.
Kant said that freedom of the will could neither be proved nor
disproved. This left the matter open so far as human cognition was
concerned. But man's moral nature forced him to postulate freedom
as an inescapable condition of the moral life. Without freedom, Kant
felt, morality would have no meaning. Nietzsche chose the other
postulate, namely, determinism and challenged the world to remake
its morals in accordance with this view. That tradition in Western
culture is at least as old as Democritus. It is the immemorial moral
base of the Eastern religions. Perhaps the West is doomed to accept
this along with numerous other aspects of Oriental psychology and
religion in exchange for extending to the Oriental and African peoples
the doubtful blessings of machine culture, together with the political
systems of democracy and communism.
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NIETZSCHE AS AUTHOR

I should not like to rest the matter of Nietzsche's importance for
contemporary, jurisprudence on the value to it of his revolutionary
ideas alone. There are more questions of vital importance to jurisprudence than any of us can possibly attend to. Anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology, statistics, psychoanalysis, philosophy
all press on some part or other of the law. We are haunted by the
number of things left undone at the end of the day, not merely things
unsaid or untaught, but even unthought. Why should we crowd into
the dilapidated, overpopulated and understaffed mansions we call
our minds so unruly a tenant as Nietzsche? I answer that we should
let him in because he is both absolutely honest and also highly
talented. This-combination is rare today. Our hideous money culture
buys up talent and turns it loose in the form of propaganda. Where
can one get unbought, unbiased, wholly honest and profound criticism
of the delicate weak points of our age: its moralities and its religions?
Gifted people stay away from these subjects; those who do handle
them are safe. I do not mean to intimate that Nietzsche was unbiased. He was fearfully biased-but his bias was his own. Moreover he remains the only high-class myth-shatterer and culturedeflater who is also good fun. The one form of nourishment the
modern intellectual lacks more than anything else is entertainment.
Nietzsche is sparkling good fun at a very high intellectual level. The
keenest, the subtlest, and most honest psychologist in modern times
is ready to tickle us with the foibles and vanities of our friends, our
enemies, our entourage generally (could it possibly be even ourselves?). Nietzsche was a psychoanalyst before psychoanalysis. His
probing lacks the heavy-handed seriousness of the head-shrinkers; it
is not for that reason any the less profound. Above all things else,
Nietzsche was never dull. He regarded dullness as the worst conceivable offense against good taste. When dullness was combined with
ponderous learning or academic pretension Nietzsche was particularly
outraged. He labored to perfect a concise and dramatic way of
getting his thought across in aphorisms. Where connected discourse
was in order, he kept it short and to the point. Elsewhere he used the
prose poem. Zarathustrais the best example.
I am told that the early English translations of Nietzsche's writings
are quite untrustworthy. Certainly they can hardly sustain his reputation as a modern literary figure of first importance. Fortunately,
newer translations are appearing. Those I know of are mentioned
in a note.29 In the meantime, we can hope that the general estimate
29. Translations of Nietzsche into English, 1950-1960:

PORTABLE NIETZSCHE,

(Viking ed., Kaufmann, transl. 1954); BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, (M. Cowan,
transl. 1955); BrTH OF TRAGEDY and THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, (F. Golfing

1960]
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of Nietzsche as a ranting atheist and a revolutionary madman will
slowly be corrected, though the pioneering efforts of James G.
Huneker and Henry L. Mencken in this direction are already spent.
Nietzsche himself predicted that he would not be appreciated for a
hundred years. Perhaps we in America shall have the honor of
making that prophecy come true. The intellectuals of the rest of the
world seem to have anticipated us by half a century.
transl. 1956); THus SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, (M. Cowan transl. 1957);
LETTERS, (Leidecker transl. 1959).

UNPUBLSHED

There is a revision of A. Tille's translation

of Thus Spoke Zarathustraby M. M. Bozman, issued as part of the Everyman's
Library series in 1958 and a new translation of The Use and Abuse of History
by Adrian Collins, published in 1957. I have seen neither of these two translations.

